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Introduction: The Indian Army in World War One 
This thesis will examine the perceptions of Empire among soldiers of different 
backgrounds fighting for the Indian Army in World War One (WWI). Within the 
army at this time, there was a mix of Indian and British officers in command of rank-
and-file soldiers of Indian background. I will ask how deep was the attachment to the 
British Raj and the ideology of Empire on both sides and examine how the experience 
of war changed the perceptions of British commanders, British junior officers and the 
Indian soldiers.  
 
The primary sources used are mostly published memoirs, diaries and letters by 
soldiers who fought in WWI. I will be looking at the perceptions of the individuals 
who produced the primary source material. The methodology for this study is to focus 
on the language and descriptive techniques of the soldiers writing. The tone of the 
sources is important, in discussing the author’s mindset at the time of writing. From 
this we can see how their language changed through reactions to WWI.1 Some 
memoirs, written after the events in question, lack immediacy, but are still useful as 
they can tell us what remained in the author’s memory, which tells us what was 
important to them.2 We can still learn of the perceptions of the time, by what stands 
out in the memory of the author. We can see what is remembered and how. 
 
The Indian Army began with the competition between the French and the 
British in the initial struggle for India, but it did not take the shape it held in WWI 
until 1858.3 The system of rank in the Indian Army at this time was unique. The non-
commissioned ranks were similar to those of the British Army, with Indian ranks 
corresponding to British ranks, such as private, corporal or sergeant. The Indian 
officers were unique. They were subordinate to all British officers, intended as the 
                                                 
1 For examples of similar methodology see, for example: J. M. Winter, The Great War and the British 
People (Basingstoke, 1985), pp. 279-305 and J. M. Winter, The Experience of World War One 
(Edinburgh, 1990). 
2 For a discussion of how the mind remembers, see: A. M. Hoffman and H. S. Hoffman, ‘Memory 
Theory: Personal and Social’, in T. L. Charlton et al., Handbook of Oral History (New York, 2006), 
pp. 275-296. For a useful discussion of memory with regard to WWI see: A. Thompson, ANZAC 
Memories: Living with the Legend (Melbourne, 1994). For more perspectives on memory in history 
see, for example: D. Middleton and D. Edwards, ‘Introduction’, in D. Middleton and D. Edwards (eds), 
Collective Remembering (London, 1990), pp. 1-22 and J. Le Goff, History and Memory (New York, 
1992). 
3 P. Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men (London, 1974). 
link between Indian rankers and the British officers.4 In 1914, the Indian Army 
consisted of 159,000 Indian officers and men, along with 2,300 British officers.5 By 
the end of 1914, they made up almost one-third of the British Expeditionary Force in 
France.6 On the Western Front, the Indian Army lost 500 British officers, 500 Indian 
officers, and 20,000 other ranks.7 The Indian Army fought on the Western Front from 
1914-1915, but the infantry were removed to the Middle East in late 1915. The 
cavalry remained until 1918, though did not see much action.8 Each Indian Army 
battalion arrived in France with 750 Indian officers and men, and usually 11 or 12 
British officers, considerably fewer than in the British Army.9  
 
The analysis will be divided into three chapters. Chapter One will discuss the 
perceptions of the British commanders of the Indians’ role in the Indian Army. 
Chapter Two will focus on the British junior officers, who had a combat role in WWI, 
and who had a closer relationship with the Indians. Chapter Three will examine the 
Indian perspective, discussing the perceptions of their role in the Indian Army and the 
Empire, and how it was affected by their experience of war. The focus of discussion 
will differ between the chapters. The British commanders and junior officers all 
discuss the Indian soldiers directly. The Indian soldiers mostly comment on the Indian 
Army or the British government as a whole, rather than any individual officer. The 
use of these sources can give a new perspective on debates over how the concept of 
martial races affected the British and how WWI affected loyalty to the Empire. 
 
The historiography of the Indian Army in WWI began with a semi-official 
history by Merewether and Smith published in 1919.10 A few memoirs were then 
published, mostly from the high command, such as With the Indians in France by 
General James Willcox.11 Many letters and diaries have been published only recently, 
                                                 
4 Willcox, With the Indians in France, pp. 1-6; Omissi (ed.), Indian Voices of the Great War, pp. xxi-
xxii (page numbers given in roman numerals). 
5 D. E. Omissi, ‘The Indian Army in the First World War, 1914-1918’ in D. P. Marston, and C. S. 
Sundaram, A Military History of India and South Asia - From the East India Company to the Nuclear 
Era (New Delhi, 2007), pp. 74-75. 
6 Ibid., pp. 74-78. 
7 Ibid., p. 75. 
8 Ibid., pp. 80-83.  
9 D. E. Omissi (ed.), Indian Voices of the Great War – Soldiers’ Letters, 1914-1919 (Basingstoke, 
1999), pp. xxi-xxii (page numbers given in roman numerals). 
10 J. W. B. Merewether and F. Smith, The Indian Corps in France (London, 1919). 
11 J. Willcox, With the Indians in France (London, 1920).  
some within the last 10 years. These publications have opened the subject up for 
further research and raised more questions. Very little secondary material was 
produced until Greenhut published some important articles in the 1980s on the 
relationship between the British and the Indian soldiers in the Indian Army. Martin 
wrote an article on the influence of racial attitudes on British policy towards India 
during WWI.12 General histories of WWI, such as those by Strachan and Keegan for 
example, have discussed the Indian Army to some extent.13 These works focus on 
their arrival at the Western Front, major battles, such as Neuve Chappelle and their 
early removal to the Middle Eastern Front, but do not explore issues raised in this 
thesis.14  
 
Following these minor works, major studies have appeared with some 
regularity. David Omissi research has been particularly important in increasing our 
understanding of Indian soldiers in WWI.15 His collection of letters, though they have 
not yet been thoroughly analysed, presents a rich set of primary sources for this study. 
Ellinwood produced a study of the 44 years long diary of Amar Singh.16 This work is 
                                                 
12 J. Greenhut, ‘Shahib and Sepoy: An Inquiry into the Relationship between the British Officers and 
Native Soldiers of the British Indian Army’, Military Affairs 48, 1 (1984), pp. 15-18: J. Greenhut, ‘The 
Imperial Reserve: The Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914-1915’, 12, 1, (1983) pp. 54-73 and J. 
Greenhut, ‘Race, Sex and War: The Impact of Race and Sex on Morale and Health Services for the 
Indian Corps on the Western Front, 1914’, Military Affairs, 45, 2 (1981), pp. 71-74. G. Martin, ‘The 
Influence of Racial Attitudes on British Policy Towards India during the First World War’, The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 14, 2 (1986), pp. 91-113. 
13 J. Keegan, The First World War (London, 1998), pp. 140-142. H. Strachan, The First World War 
(London, 2004), pp. 82-84. 
14 Neuve Chapelle was one of the major battles fought by the Indian Infantry on the Western Front. 
There were 4,200 Indian casualties. See: http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/neuvechapelle.htm: 
date accessed Friday, 3 October, 2008. 
15 For Omissi’s work, see: D. E. Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj (Basingstoke, 1994); Omissi, ‘The 
Indian Army in the First World War’, pp. 74-87; D. E. Omissi, ‘Europe through Indian Eyes: Indian 
Soldiers Encounter England and France, 1914-1918’, English Historical Review 122, 498 (2007), pp. 
371-296; D. E. Omissi, ‘Sepoys in the Trenches: The Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-1915 by 
Gordon Corrigan’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 29, 2 (2001), pp. 178-180; Omissi, 
(ed.), Indian Voices and D. E. Omissi, ‘India: Some Perceptions of Race and Empire’ in D. E. Omissi 
and A. S. Thompson (eds.), The Impact of the South African War (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 215-232. 
For a much smaller work on the letters of Indian soldiers from WWI with a very specific focus, see S. 
VanKoski, ‘Letters Home, 1915-1916: Punjabi Soldiers Reflect on War and Life in Europe and their 
Meanings for Home and Self’, International Journal of Punjab Studies, 2, (1995), pp. 43-63. For a 
recent and useful overview of the Indian role, and other ‘underdeveloped’ nations in WWI see B. 
Waites, ‘Peoples of the Underdeveloped World’ in H. Cecil and P. H. Liddle (eds.), Facing 
Armageddon – The First World War Experienced (Barnsley, 2003), pp. 596-614. 
16 D. C. Ellinwood, Between Two Worlds: A Rajput Officer in the Indian Army, 1905-21 (Lanham, 
2005). The Diary of Amar Singh has been published, but will not be used in this study as it is heavily 
edited, and does not contain any entries made during WWI. See S. H. Rudolph and L. I. Rudolph (eds), 
Reversing the Gaze: Amar Singh's Diary: A Colonial Subject's Narrative of Imperial India (Boulder, 
2002). 
very descriptive, though it focuses just one man’s experience and does not make 
broader arguments on the Indian war experience. Corrigan, a former Gurkha officer, 
produced a history of the Indian Army on the Western Front, arguing that the Indians 
fought with great skill and gallantry under difficult conditions.17 
 
We must also look at the background of the Indian Army. The soldiers 
fighting were drawn mostly from the ‘martial races’ of India.18 The classification was 
drawn from the Indian caste system and the self-image of some communities, such as 
the North-Indian Rajputs. As a result, over half the Indian Army in WWI was from a 
single community in the Punjab and the remainder from Nepal, the United Provinces 
and the North-West Frontier Province.19 Regiments were usually segregated on the 
basis of religion, language and community. They were recruited from rural areas, 
often-backward ones.20 The selection of sources in this study can give a new 
perspective on debates on how the idea of martial races affected the British and how 
WWI affected enthusiasm for the Empire. Understanding where the Indian soldiers 
came from is important in considering the soldiers’ mentality in the trenches and their 
perceptions of the British Empire. 21 
 
The Raj has a very large historiography, so I will focus on cultural relations 
and racial attitudes within British India.22 One of the major factors in this relationship 
was British racism.23 The ‘progressive’ nature of Empire was particularly important 
as an element in British legitimation of their rule in India. I am interested in 
discussing how the concept of martial races was important as a factor in how British 
                                                 
17 G. Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches (Stroud, 2006). 
18 On martial races, see for example: G. F. MacMunn, The Martial Races of India (London, 1933); 
Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj; L. Caplan, Warrior Gentlemen: ‘Gurkhas’, in the Western Imagination 
(Oxford, 1995) and H. Streets, Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial 
Culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester, 2004).  
19 Omissi, ‘The Indian Army in the First World War’, p. 75. 
20 Ibid. 
21 On the recruitment for the Indian Army, see: K. Roy, Brown Warriors of the Raj: Recruitment and 
the Mechanics of Command in the Sepoy Army, 1859-1913 (New Delhi, 2008) and Omissi, Sepoy and 
the Raj, pp. 1-46. 
22 For a largely British perspective see: L. James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of British India 
(New York, 1998). For studies of ideology and culture see: T. R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj 
(Melbourne, 2005); K. Ballhatchet, Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj (London, 1980); H. Tinker, 
Separate and unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-1950 (St. Lucia, 
1976). For a study of masculinity in the Empire see: P. F. McDevitt, ‘May the Best Man Win’ – Sport, 
Masculinity, and Nationalism in Great Britain and the Empire, 1880-1935 (New York, 2004). 
23 This is often identified as an issue, for example: Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj and Ballhatchet, 
Under the Raj. 
officers saw the Indian soldiers. This study will contribute to our understandings of 
how the Empire worked in the personal perceptions between ‘senior’ and 
‘subordinate’ in the Empire’s hierarchy.  
 
Over a large period, covering roughly the Indian Rebellion in 1857 to Partition 
in 1947, race relations within the Indian Army were delicate. Indianization gave 
expression to British racial approaches to the Indian Army. It was both a debate about 
how much power Indian officers should hold in the Indian Army and the process by 
which they were given more power. 24 A classic approach is provided by Sharpe, who 
argues that racism and prejudice made for painfully slow progress.25 This thesis will 
demonstrate that the British officers’ opinions were more varied and diverse than has 
previously been acknowledged in the approach of Sharpe and others.  
 
Ellis has produced a descriptive study of daily life in the trenches. He 
discusses aspects such as constant shelling, living in mud, the constant threat of death, 
injury and destruction, and the helpless vulnerability many felt.26 There are also many 
collections of letters and diaries, which show primary source evidence of the different 
experiences. Many soldiers were disillusioned with the war, and became depressed, 
while others remained committed to their nation’s cause.27 Widespread 
disillusionment has led Mann to argue that WWI was partly responsible for 
diminishing enthusiasm for the Empire.28 However, the prominence of 
disillusionment in the trenches is still debated. Debate has centred on the effect of the 
                                                 
24 For discussion of Indianization see: Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj; Mason, Honour: A. Sharpe, ‘The 
Indianisation of the Indian Army’, History Today, 34 (March, 1986) pp.47-52) and S. P. Cohen, The 
Indian Army Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation (Berkeley, 1971). For an alternative 
approach to Indianization see: P. Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817-
1949 (Westport, 2003). 
25 Sharpe, ‘Indianisation of the Indian Army’. Cohen, Mason and Omissi follow similar arguments. 
Sharpe’s is a brief article which provides an overview of their arguments. See: Omissi, Sepoy and the 
Raj; Mason, Honour; Cohen, The Indian Army.  
26 J. Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World War 1 (New York, 1976). For a discussion of 
why men fought, and how it affected them, see: N. Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York, 1999), pp. 
346-366. 
27 There are many examples of such collections, but see for example: S. Palmer and S. Wallis (eds), 
Intimate Voices of the First World War (London, 2005); L. Macdonald (ed.), 1914-1918, Voices and 
Images of the Great War (London, 1991) and M. Arthur (ed.), Forgotten Voices of the Great War 
(London, 2002). 
28 M. Mann, ‘“Torchbearers Upon the Path of Progress”: Britain’s Ideology of a “Moral and Material 
Progress” in India. An Introductory Essay’, in H. Fischer-Tiné and M. Mann (eds), Colonialism as 
Civilizing Mission – Cultural Ideology in British India (London, 2004), pp. 1-26. Mann is discussion 
disillusionment on the ‘home front’ as well as in the trenches.  
trench experience on soldiers’ pre-1914 beliefs. The ‘traditionalist’ approach suggests 
that WWI completely washed away soldiers pre-1914 ideals and that disillusionment 
was near universal.29 ‘Revisionist’ historians have argued that the experience was far 
more varied and that many soldiers maintained their beliefs, or they were even 
strengthened. 30 The Indian Army has, so far, been left out of this debate. This thesis 
will add to our understanding of soldiers’ previous ideals on the Western Front, by 
making the Indian Army the focus of discussion. 
 
Some of the memoirs and diaries used in this study originate from the Middle 
Eastern front. All the major works on the Indian Army in WWI, including Omissi, 
Corrigan and Greenhut, focus on the Western Front and disregard the Middle Eastern 
Front.31 The major works on the Middle Eastern front tend to be military histories.32 
These works offer very little in the way of insight into the personal relationships 
within the army. As I am focusing my discussion on the effect that war experience 
had on people’s perceptions, these differences will be discussed only when they are 
relevant to these perceptions.  
 
This study will contribute to knowledge by showing how the British junior 
officers’ perceptions differed from those of the commanders. Many previous scholars 
have discussed British/Indian relations from the perspective of British generals and 
rulers. This will be the first study to look at the junior officers in the Indian Army in 
WWI from primary sources. I will compare their opinions with those of commanding 
officers, which will show how shared combat experience and a direct relationship 
                                                 
29 For examples of this approach, see: D. Winter, Death’s Men: Soldiers of the Great War (Suffolk, 
1978) and P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, (New York, 1975). 
30 See, for example: B. Bond, The Unquiet Western Front: Britain’s Role in Literature and History 
(Cambridge, 2002), pp. 75-101Bond, The Unquiet Western Front; J. S. K. Watson, Fighting Different 
Wars: Experience, Memory, and the First World War in Britain (New York, 2004) and G. Sheffield, 
Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities (London, 2002). 
31 Omissi (ed.), Indian Voices; Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’ and Corrigan, Sepoys in the Trenches. 
All these works specifically focus on the Western Front.  
32 This is a flaw admitted by Omissi when he provides an overview of the period in his introduction to 
Indian Voices of the Great War. Omissi (ed.), Indian Voices, pp. 1-22. For military histories WWI in 
the Middle East, see: A. J. Barker, The Neglected War – Mesopotamia, 1914-1918 (London, 1967) and 
R. Willcox, Battles on the Tigris - The Mesopotamian Campaign of the First World War (Barnsley, 
2006). For social war history, see D. R. Woodward, Forgotten Soldiers of the First World War: Lost 
Voices from the Middle Eastern Front (Stroud, 2006). For a discussion of life on the Middle Eastern 
front for the Indian Army, see M. Harrison, ‘The Fight Against Disease in the Mesopotamian 
Campaign’, in H. Cecil and P. H. Liddle (eds.), Facing Armageddon: The First Word War Experienced 
(London, 1996), pp. 475-489. 
with the Indian soldiers had a great effect on an individual’s perception of the Indian 
soldiers. I will also contribute to our understanding of how the Indian soldiers related 
to the Empire, and how deeply this relationship was felt. Mason, VanKoski and 
Cohen have argued that Empire, honour and loyalty mostly motivated the Indians.33 
Omissi and Barua have argued that in addition, they were motivated by financial 
incentives.34 This study will contribute to this debate, through its use of new primary 
sources and its focus on WWI testing of these ideals. 
 
 
                                                 
33 Mason, Honour; VanKoski, ‘Punjabi Soldiers’, pp. 44-63 and Cohen, Indian Army. 
34 Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 1-46 and Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj, pp. 1-15. 
Chapter One: British Commanders  
 
This chapter will focus on the perceptions of Indian soldiers held by British 
commanders. To study this effectively, it will be necessary to discussion the 
historiography of cultural relations within the Raj and military histories of the Indian 
Army. The primary sources in this chapter are published memoirs by British 
commanders of the Indian Army in WWI. As commanders in the Indian Army, they 
had close first hand experience of India and its people over a long period of time, but 
were also instrumental in the management of the Raj.  
 
The first two chapters will argue that previous historians have not discussed 
combat experience of the British officers and that this has left significant gaps in our 
understanding of the Indian Army in WWI. The approach taken by scholars of the 
Indian Army has been to focus on sources from high-level commanding officers and 
politicians in the Raj. The perceptions and experiences of all these officers will be 
compared, contrasted and analysed.  
 
Cohen has argued that martial races were ‘less a theory than a catch-all 
phrase’ which was used to justify different roles for Indian groups through 
stereotypes.35 His discussion of race-relations is based largely on the structure of the 
Indian Army and the people behind it, such as Curzon, Kitchener and Willcox. 
Historians of the Indian Army commonly use these sources.36 The historiography can 
be broken down into certain identifiable aspects of broader British perceptions of the 
Indian Army: Indian notions of honour or izzat; the role of the Indians in the army; 
Indian bravery and martial races. As many scholars have viewed racism as 
fundamental to British perceptions of the Indians, this discussion will also focus on 
the actual prevalence and nature of racism in the Indian Army.  
 
Greenhut discussed Indianization and the Indian role in WWI in a series of 
brief articles in the 1980s. He concluded that the British officers were ‘unashamedly 
racist’ – they believed that they were inherently superior to the Indian soldiers and 
                                                 
35 Cohen, Indian Army, p. 45. 
36 Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj, pp. 153-191; Greenhut, ‘The Imperial Reserve’. Omissi and Greenhut use 
the same sources, even the same quotes.  
while they may have admired or loved their soldiers, they never forgot their 
perception of themselves as superior.37 Greenhut argues that this was based in British 
Christian morality, which demanded they respect their ‘inferiors’, but only as a father 
may treat a backward child.38 Elsewhere, Greenhut argues that Social Darwinism and 
racism provided a comforting justification for Empire, and were fundamental in the 
mindset of the British officers.39 The issue of honour is a major part of the arguments 
of Greenhut and others. Mason discusses the importance of honour and loyalty 
arguing that in the Indian Army disloyalty was treason, with total obedience 
required.40 The Indian soldiers had to show great loyalty before their officers would 
show them some level of respect or conceived of them as heroic.41 
 
Barua’s work is useful in understanding these subjects from a British 
perspective.42 Barua places his study in a wider context of British Imperial culture.43 
He is aware of social trends in Britain, as his article Inventing Race suggests.44 In this 
article, he outlines the way in which the British ‘discovered’ martial races, based on 
many faulty assumptions and pseudo-scientific examinations of ethnic groups. 
Loyalty was the first thing that was looked for.45 Previously, it had been argued that 
the theory of martial races was used to divide and rule in India.46 Barua argues that 
the classification of races was used by the British to help understand and rule in India, 
and that they genuinely believed that certain ethnic groups were more suited to 
military life than others. Gentlemen of the Raj has been criticised as an apology for 
British policies.47 The work perhaps focuses on the British perspective, but as a study 
of the Indian Army it produces a better cultural study that military-focused historians 
                                                 
37 Greenhut, ‘Sahib and Sepoy’, p. 16. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid., p. 70. 
40 Mason, Honour, p. 406. 
41 Cohen, The Indian Army and Mason, Honour. Cohen, in another history of the Indian army, came to 
similar conclusions. 
42 For Barua’s work see: Barua, Gentlemen of the Raj and P. P. Barua, ‘Inventing Race: The British and 
India’s Martial Races’, The Historian, 58, 1 (1995), pp. 107-116. 
43 Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj; Cohen, The Indian Army; Sharpe, Indianisation and W. Gutteridge ‘The 
Indianisation of the Indian Army 1918-45’ Race, 4, 63 (1963), pp. 39-48. 
44 Barua, ‘Inventing Race’, pp. 107-116. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid. This can be seen in the histories of the Indian Army by Cohen and Mason. See Cohen, The 
Indian Army, pp. 32-57 and Mason, Honour, pp. 341-361. 
47 A. Deshpande, ‘Gentlemen of the Raj: The Indian Army Officer Corps, 1817–1949 by Pradeep P. 
Barua.’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32, 3 (2004), pp. 152-154. 
Mason and Cohen. This study can contribute to this debate by showing the nature of 
British perceptions of race, through high-level sources such as commanders, as well 
as previously unused sources from junior officers.  
 
To place the study of the Indian Army in historical context I would like to 
discuss how the recruitment strategy of martial races was influenced by British 
Imperial ideology. Metcalf and Metcalf argue that in the 1870s British concepts of 
enlightenment and progress gave way to authoritarian rule by the perceived superior 
race.48 The Indian Rebellion in 1857 was important in the development of the martial 
races theory.49 The event damaged the romantic notions of empire and led to security-
conscious policies, which reinforced racism in late-Victorian England.50 Previously, 
the Raj had been justified though focusing on the similarities of the British and the 
Indians. After the Indian Rebellion, a pessimistic stance replaced Victorian 
romanticism, leading the British to focus on the differences. Metcalf argues 
‘difference’ then became the main justification for the Raj.51 The cause of the 
rebellion was seen to be certain ethnic groups in the army: Gurkhas, Sikhs and 
Rajputs remained loyal and accepted British supremacy, whereas Bengalis rebelled.52 
The British began to look upon the former groups as having ‘innate’ loyalty.53 
 
Barua argues that the British justified their rule though ‘superiority’. They 
believed themselves to be the superior race, and that they could therefore improve the 
lives of the inferior race. Colonial ethnographers had a considerable effect on shaping 
British attitudes.54 Scientific Racism is the use of scientific (or pseudo-scientific) 
                                                 
48 B. D. Metcalf and T. R. Metcalf, A Concise History of India (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 91-93.  
49 For a detailed discussion on the events of the Indian Rebellion, see; S. David, The Indian Mutiny 
(London, 2004). On older approaches to the event, see, for example; R. Collier, The Great Indian 
Mutiny (New York, 1964) and S. B. Chaudhuri Theories of the Indian Mutiny (1857-9): A study of the 
views of the of an Eminent Historian on the Subject (Calcutta, 1965). For an excellent discussion of 
how the ‘mutiny’ has been treated by historians, and how it affected British racial attitudes, see Metcalf 
and Metcalf, History of India, pp. 91-122. This subject is also covered by Mason, when discussing 
changes after the ‘mutiny’, Mason, Honour, pp. 313-317. 
50 For discussions on how the Rebellion affected the British see; Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj, For a 
study of the Indian Rebellion in English literature G. Chakravarty, The Indian Mutiny and the British 
Imagination (Cambridge, 2005). See also, Judd, Lion and the Tiger, pp. 70-90. 
51 Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj.  
52 Barua, Inventing Race, pp. 107-116.  
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. An example of this work is Risley’s The People of India which was considered very important 
when published. See H. H. Risley The People of India (Delhi, 1908). The analysis in this book is 
divided into ‘physical types’, ‘social types’ and discussions of caste. 
studies to promote racial differences. Such studies have often been used to underpin 
racist social policies.55 Recently, Inden has mocked the objective and scientific merit 
of British colonial ethnographers’ studies.56 Still, they can tell us a lot about how the 
British saw Indian society and how it was classified, though extremely poor as 
anthropological studies by today’s standards.57  
 
Part of this classification was the search for ‘martial races’. The British 
thought that the ‘martial’ groups understood the meaning of honour and duty, 
summed up in the term ‘izzat’.58 Izzat was intended to be a major guiding force for the 
Indian Army. Omissi wrote that it was a standard to which the Indians aspired. 
Military honour can take many forms, and is difficult to define. Izzat can be translated 
as ‘honour’ ‘self-respect’ or ‘prestige’.59 Of course, ‘honour’ is not unique to the 
Indian Army, though the British believed izzat to be distinctly Indian.60 Robinson 
discusses honour in the military very broadly. He gives four virtues tied with military 
honour: prowess: courage: loyalty and truthfulness.61 In the Indian Army, izzat took 
the form of an informal but widely understood code of conduct. It was not written 
down or clearly defined, meaning it meant different things to different people. Indian 
soldiers write of izzat as something eternal that would stay with them long after their 
deaths. It reflected on more than just individuals. In many cases it was written about 
as reflecting on family, military unit, caste, or the whole of India. Some Indians wrote 
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of izzat as something that would stay with them after death, into the afterlife.62 In 
many ways, izzat appears no different to other forms of honour. As a code it asks for 
loyalty, gallantry, honest, and for soldiers do their duty. The main difference between 
izzat and British honour is that it is emphasised as more explicitly eternal, important 
in shaping a soldiers afterlife and reflects further than on an individual and their 
immediate family. Importantly, it was thought by colonial ethnographers that 
‘honour’ was more powerful for Indian soldiers that for British ones.63 This is strong 
example of Metcalf’s concept of difference, as the British and Indian conceptions of 
honour are quite similar, yet the British emphasised the differences between the two. 
Omissi argues that the British were aware of the power of izzat and so created more 
awards and decorations so as to inspire the Indians and to bind them in loyalty.64 This 
was aimed at tying izzat to the British Empire, which was quite successful, as many 
soldiers were devoted to duty to the British Empire.65 
 
British conceptions of izzat were linked to martial races. To understand the 
concept of martial races we should consider its opposite: non-martial races. 
Particularly following the Indian Rebellion, the Bengalis were not considered martial, 
because they did not have a strong conception of duty. This was essentially because 
they were instigators of the Rebellion. They were thought of as lacking izzat, so 
recruitment focused on those who possessed it.66 Francis Yeats-Brown wrote in his 
classic interpretation of martial races, Martial India, that the Sikh had five 
distinguishing marks.67 These included uncut hair and a steel or iron bracelet to 
remind him of his martial heritage. Yeats believed that the Sikhs became martial 
because they had been hardened by persecution under the Mughul Emperors.68 He 
also wrote that the Sikhs and Gurkhas were the only races he had encountered that 
‘really liked fighting’.69 Visual, mental and historical factors defined martial races. It 
was thought that the Sikhs looked, thought and fought in very specific ways. This 
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thesis will discuss the extent to which the British officers saw the Indian soldiers 
within such narrow frameworks. 
 
To understand British conceptions of Indian bravery, we can refer to the 
stereotype Greenhut discussed: that the Indians were childlike, and needed strong 
British guidance.70 The British conception of Indian heroism was that they were 
courageous, but they did not temper this with reason. Omissi pointed out that this 
reputation for thickheadedness had some basis in fact, because the Indian soldiers 
were recruited from the least literate sections of the population.71 In histories of the 
Indian Army, British perceptions of the temperament of the Indian soldiers are often 
examined using sources written by generals and politicians, particularly in discussions 
of Indianization. Omissi, Sharpe, Cohen and Mason use these sources as evidence for 
all British perspectives of the Indian Army.72 According to these historians, all British 
officers were particularly condescending, and did not believe it was the role of the 
Indians to lead.  
 
We should bear in mind when analysing language that there are significant 
differences between a military and a civilian setting. All armies have a culture of 
hierarchy.73 This is aimed at defining clear command structures, but it also changes 
personal relationships and perceptions within the army. Holding a position of 
leadership forces a person to see units as broad groups of people, rather than 
individuals.74 Goddard, a former Indian Army officer turned historian, makes this 
point when discussing ethnic groups within the Indian Army.75 This suggests that the 
commanders in the Indian Army used the martial races discourse partly because of 
their position. The use of such generalisations is not enough to constitute racism; an 
attitude of superiority must be based on racial characteristics to be considered racist.76  
                                                 
70 Greenhut, ‘Sahib and Sepoy’, p. 15. 
71 Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj, p. 27. 
72 Omissi, Sepoy and the Raj, Sharpe ‘Indianisation’, Mason, Honour, and Cohen, Indian Army. This 
perspective will be discussed further in Chapter Two.  
73 M. Janowitz and W. R. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (California, 1974), pp. 43-
65. 
74 G. Henderson, ‘Leadership’, in, G. Henderson (ed.), Human Relations in the Military – Problems 
and Programs (Chicago, 1975) pp. 1-18; G. Henderson, ‘Preface’, in, Henderson (ed.), Human 
Relations in the Military, pp. vii-vii. 
75 E. Goddard, ‘The Indian Army – Company and Raj’, Asian Affairs, 63, 3 (1976), p. 264. 
76 Henderson, ‘Race Relations’, pp. 53-55. 
 Racism, honour and martial races are the key themes of historiography of the 
Indian Army. How commonly held, though were British perceptions of Indian 
soldiers, outlined by Greenhut and Omissi? How did WWI affect these conceptions? 
These issues will now be addressed through thorough examination of memoirs of 
diaries of British officers.   
 
With The Indians in France by General James Willcox 
 
General Sir James Willcox was born in 1857, and joined the Leinster regiment 
in 1878. He took full command of an operation for the first time in 1899.77 WWI was 
his first role with the Indian Army, though he had previously spent four years in 
India.78 He commanded Indian Army WWI operations on the Western Front from 
1914-1915.79 His introductory chapter gives insight into his opinions, as it is largely 
about the nature and structure of the Indian Army.80 This is not an unused primary 
source; it is one of the most frequently cited works in histories of the Indian Army 
and their role on the Western Front. It is because of this heavy use, though, that it is 
necessary to have a thorough understanding of it in order to understand the 
conclusions made by previous historians. 
 
Willcox notes the ‘shortcomings’ of the Indian army and states that the British 
officers overcame them.81 Following this, he discusses the Indian officers, seeing 
them as:  
 
men who had earned their commissions by brave and loyal service, of 
fighting stock, with martial traditions, ready to give their lives for their 
King Emperor, proud of the profession of arms; they formed the essential 
link between the British officers and men.82 
 
This shows his beliefs immediately, commenting on ‘fighting stock’ and ‘martial 
traditions’. His praise is tempered by the belief that they could not replace the British 
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officer in the field – not because they lack ‘bravery and self-sacrifice’, but because 
‘training and temperament at present stand in [their] way’.83 His last words in this 
book are ‘you can NEVER replace the British officer in the Indian Army’.84 He is 
commenting on the prospect of Indianization. To be fair to Willcox, he also argues 
that Indian officers were not paid enough, and that they should have been given rank 
equal to that of the British officers.85 Given the other evidence for his opinions, this 
may be one small shade of grey in a book that otherwise presents only black and 
white. 
 
Willcox’s view of the Indian soldiers’ motivation further confirms his 
opinions as fitting with the discourse of honour or izzat. He states that: ‘izzat is a thing 
little understood by any but Indians, but it is a great driving force; it raises men in the 
estimation of their fellows, whilst the loss of it debases them.’86 This ties into martial 
racism, which saw izzat as something particular to the martial races of India. Izzat was 
used by the British with the lure of medals and awards.87 Whether or not this was 
truly important to the Indian soldier will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Thee, 
but clearly Willcox thought it was of great importance.  
 
Willcox gives a very good example of how the idea of martial races could 
affect a British officer’s perception of the Indian soldiers. He wrote that he had:  
 
soldiered with Rajputs and Jats, Pathans, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi 
Mahomedans, Madras Sappers and Miners, Dogras, Garhwalis and other 
races. Each has its characteristics, and these must be recognised by any 
one entrusted with the command of Indian troops.88 
 
 This approach is characteristic of the book, for Willcox looks at all the ‘fighting 
races’ and discusses how well they acquitted themselves in the war. He lists them all 
as having very particular qualities, which affected their performance in the trenches. 
For example, he wrote that the Dogras: ‘are quiet, steady, clean soldiers’; the Pathans 
‘have quicker wits than the other races’ and the Sikhs are ‘fine manly soldier[s]’, but 
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should not be spoiled or pampered.89 Henderson wrote on the topic of leadership in 
the context of an army, and argued that an effective leader must understand the 
characteristics of the group that he leads.90 We can extend this to the position of 
Willcox, who was in charge of several different groups, which were classifiable in 
British racial ideology as Jats, Pathans, etc. While this may help to explain his explicit 
focus on grouping soldiers, he assigns particular qualities across broad ‘racial’ groups. 
While his leadership position can help to show why the concept of martial races 
resonates so strongly with Willcox, this still shows the very strong influence of racial 
notions on his perceptions of the Indian soldiers.  
 
The evidence seems to suggest that Willcox is trying to present a very positive 
view of all involved with the Indian army, but within strict boundaries of what he saw 
to be the roles of people of different ranks and backgrounds. This may not be at all 
unusual from a general in any army, but in this case, the structure contains inherent 
racial prejudice. He did not see Indian soldiers as capable of higher thought or 
advancement through the ranks. This view fits very comfortably within the 
scholarship discussed above which focuses on racism. Of course, this work is cited 
frequently in studies of the Indian Army. For example, Omissi and Greenhut both 
quote Willcox discussing the Indianization process:91 ‘I firmly believe the British 
officers … will unanimously agree with me’.92  And here, I believe, lies the difficulty: 
the opinions of the highest-ranking officers are widely accepted as representative of 
the British officers as whole. Yet these officers were the ones with the most limited 
contact with the Indian soldiers. They view the Indians from the greatest distance, 
and, detached by their position, fail to see the details. This issue will be covered in 
more depth in Chapter Two, but for now, I will focus on what other commanding 
officers, in positions similar to Willcox, thought of their Indian charges.  
 
On Two Fronts: Being the Adventures of an Indian Mule Corps in France and 
Gallipoli by Major Herbert Alexander.  
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Major H. M. Alexander was with the 9th Mule Corps of the Indian Army in 
France and Gallipoli in WWI. He was the sole British officer in command of his 
company of 500 men and 768 mules.93 The job of this Corps was to bring supplies to 
men at the front. The work was written two years after the events it recounts and 
written largely from memory, though it does contain factual information and dates 
and is based on diary writings to some extent.94  
 
Initially his focus is not the Indian troops, indeed he appears more interested 
in the qualities of his horse, Mahdi.95 He does not have a great deal to say about the 
men, though snippets do come through. We can learn something from his lack of 
comments on the Indian soldiers. That he makes few mentions of the Indian rank-and-
file suggests that they were not of great importance to him. When they are mentioned, 
it is usually when something heroic, funny or entertaining had occurred. One event of 
heroism stuck in his mind. He describes two Indians being captured by the Germans, 
leaving their mules behind by a haystack.  
 
After a time, their captors being fully occupied with their own affairs, 
the two Indians managed to slip away. They did not make straight for 
our lines. Not a bit of it. They sought and found the haystack, recovered 
their mules, reloaded them with the ammunition-boxes and strolled in.96 
 
His conception of heroism is deeply racialised. A telling comment comes when 
discussing the gallantry of Captain Singh, an army doctor. ‘(Singh) was given one of 
the first Military Crosses but did not live to wear it, being killed in action shortly 
afterwards. Singh was educated in England, and was as white a man as ever lived.’97  
 
This being said, Alexander does not use the language of martial races very 
frequently. Unlike Willcox, he does not give descriptions of different ethnic groups 
listing their qualities as soldiers.98 He does use these terms, but in a different way. He 
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uses them as descriptive terms, one suspects perhaps because these were the only 
terms available to differentiate between different ethnic groups. These terms were a 
part of British discourse of the time, and the use of them does not necessarily imply 
racist attitudes. 
 
 To say that Captain Singh ‘was as white a man who ever lived’ is an 
interesting conception of bravery. This suggests that the highest compliment that can 
be paid to and Indian is to call him ‘white’. This must be taken in context: he was an 
educated man, and a doctor. In this case, he was not saying that Singh was ‘white’ in 
colour, but rather ‘white’ meaning ‘honourable’ and ‘square-dealing’, as was common 
slang at the time.99 In this case, calling an Indian white does not refer to his brave 
acts, but more his upbringing and education. That this should be summed up by the 
word ‘white’ shows Alexander thought that such qualities were generally European. 
Notions of heroism are important in understanding this. Time and again, British 
officers refer to the reckless bravery of the Indians. The British conceive the acts of 
heroism performed by Indian soldiers differently from their own. Dawson studied this 
notion of idealised masculinity and heroism in the British Empire. By looking at 
biographies, news reports and novels he found that notions of masculinity were 
important to British national imaginings.100 This notion was referred to as ‘sterling 
qualities’ by Margaret Thatcher after the Falklands war.101 The British self-conception 
of their own bravery prevalent at the time of the Empire and WWI (from which 
Thatcher’s remark drew) was based on a stoic, hardy masculinity. When Alexander 
calls Singh ‘white’ he is referring to a different kind of heroism that he saw in the 
actions of the Indian rank and file soldiers who escaped the German army. It was 
indeed brave to return to the mules instead of going straight for the trenches, but it 
was reckless. He says they ‘strolled’ in. This suggests that he believed them to be 
relaxed and almost unthinking about their actions. The British conception of Indian 
bravery in this case is that when they were brave, they were in a sense foolish or 
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irrational, as if they did not quite understand what they had done, or that they had 
been lucky.  
 
Further statements about the Indians when at Gallipoli show that Alexander 
regarded the Indians as irrational and impulsive. He describes being asked to settle a 
bet between two Indians on what was French for ‘milk’, lait, or du lait. He states that 
‘a lot of money was at stake, for an Indian is always ready to back his opinion to the 
extent of a month’s pay’.102 Alexander saw this as reckless gambling, over a pointless 
argument (indeed, both sides of this argument are correct, as Alexander informed 
them). In this case, placing large sums of money on such a debate, to see these actions 
as irrational and impulsive, and to use such language to describe it is quite reasonable. 
However, he writes of this argument as irrational, but also he states that an Indian is 
always ready to place large sums of money on his opinion. This is strong evidence to 
suggest that Alexander saw this fight over the French term for milk, and the large 
wager over it, as typically ‘Indian’.  
 
His closing statements are very complimentary to the Indians. He writes that: 
‘a more hardworking, uncomplaining, gallant lot of soldiers than the mule-drivers… 
are not to be found in the armies of the British Empire’.103 This is Alexander’s final 
praise of his unit. Hardworking, uncomplaining and gallant - exactly what do these 
words imply? That these soldiers should be described as ‘uncomplaining’ suggests 
something more of the expected role of the Indian soldier. They should not be heard 
from, they should just follow orders. This is not unsurprising in a military setting, but 
that it should be mentioned among the finest characteristics of a military unit could be 
considered condescending in its praise. Bearing this in mind, Alexander clearly had 
very specific ideas of the role of the Indians – they should work hard and not ask 
questions. In the context of his other comments on Indian heroism, it is clear that he 
believes Indian soldiers had a very specific and limited role as followers in the Indian 
Army.  
 
Clearly, honour, superiority and racial ideology were important to the people 
in command of the Indian Army in WWI. As these accounts were written after the 
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events of the war it is difficult to judge any changes in their opinions during the 
course of the war. Still, as they write unsympathetically and in the discourse of 
martial races there does not appear to have been any softening of their approach to the 
Indian soldiers. Alexander’s perception of Indian heroism is particularly telling – an 
irrational and reckless brand of bravery. However, there are differences in the ways in 
which the two authors discuss the Indians’ ‘martial heritage’. Alexander does not give 
descriptions of different martial races as having particular innate qualities, whereas 
Willcox makes a point of listing them all and identifying specific characteristics. 
When Alexander uses these terms, he does so as descriptions of separate units rather 
than as racial fighting characteristics. This is enough to suggest that the racial 
attitudes of the British varied amongst people holding high ranks in the Indian Army. 
Nevertheless, they both appear to have similar perceptions of Indian heroism and 
honour. They have similar expectations about the Indians’ role in the army - they are 
not allowed to lead because they are irrational and backward.  
 
Why did the perceptions of the commanders remain untouched by their 
experience of WWI? The answer lies largely in the nature of their position and their 
role in the army hierarchy. Their role as commanders encouraged them to see the men 
that they commanded both Indian and English as ‘other’. To command men it is 
necessary to disengage from them as individuals. This detachment allowed them to 
send the men into danger without feeling a shared personal threat. They also saw the 
Indians as ‘warlike’ members of martial races. This encouraged them in their belief 
that they could use these men to help win the war. Commanders were concerned with 
a wider range of logistical problems, such as matters of strategy, supply of equipment, 
winning battles, and keeping the war effort going. The Indian soldiers were simply 
one of the many problems they had to manage, a small aspect of a broad and 
complicated picture. Their perceptions did not change, because they were not in close 
proximity with the Indian soldiers: they were not fighting side by side in the trenches. 
Their detachment made it easier to continue to see the soldiers as inferior. 
Furthermore, a commander can more easily send soldiers into battle if they believe 
the soldier is genuine fighter, from a martial race. The commanders did not want to 
have their beliefs challenged, and they were not presented with any strong reason to 
do so. Consequently, their perceptions remained largely unchanged.  
 
Chapter Two: British Junior Officers  
 
So far, British perceptions of the Indian soldiers within the Army fit relatively 
comfortably within the discourse of racial superiority, racial differences, honour and 
loyalty. However, the analysis of secondary sources presented in Chapter One shows 
that the previous historians focused their discussion on generals and politicians who 
were detached from the Indian soldiers. As a result, the issue of combat experience 
changing British perceptions and identities has not yet been addressed. The 
inadequacies of previous works on the question of British officers’ opinions of 
Indian soldiers are not entirely surprising. Sources from the commanding officers are 
relevant and show a great deal about how important racial attitudes were to the 
British government and those in command of the Indian Army, but they cannot be 
taken as representative of other people. This chapter will focus on the officers with 
direct WWI combat experience alongside the Indian soldiers. They shared a similar 
position with Indian officers, though always outranked them, and worked closely 
with rank-and-file Indian soldiers.104  
 
The Diary of Captain Roly Grimshaw 
 
Roly Grimshaw was born in Dublin in 1879. He joined the Royal Irish 
regiment in 1899, and two years later was transferred to the 34th Poona Horse. 
Between this transfer and the outbreak of war, he spent much time in India.105 His 
diary is an excellent historical source. He writes that the final version of his diary is 
the same as the original, with the exception of purely private matters. He began to 
write with the outbreak of war, and was then severely wounded in 1915.106  
 
 Grimshaw begins his diary discussing the Indian soldiers’ decision to fight. 
He was impressed by their willingness to fight for a cause that would have been 
obscure to them. He chooses interesting language from the regimental history to 
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describe this phenomenon, which mentions the ‘innate loyalty’ of Indian soldiers.107 
In the period from 13 August 1914 to 12 September, he was en route to meet the 
Indians in Egypt, and did not encounter them. However, he makes remarks such as 
‘Britain’s entry into the war to fulfil her promise to defend a small nation made an 
instant appeal to the best instincts of the Indian people’.108 His reference to innate 
loyalty shows a particular belief in racial qualities of the Indian soldiers. 
 
It was not until September 16 that he begun to make more detailed mentions 
of the Indian units he encountered. On this day, he described the march past of the 
Indian troops, past the local ‘riff-raff’. He wrote: 
 
I was utterly disgusted at the entire display. The officers badly mounted, 
untidy, and sitting their horses like jellyfish. The men out of step, with 
broken sections, ragged ranks and talking and looking about them as if on 
a Mohurrum festival … it looked like a retreat from Moscow.109  
 
Grimshaw was clearly very disappointed by this display, but racial sentiments are not 
explicitly expressed. British soldiers showing a lack of discipline in their marches 
would have similarly offended him. However, it does show his belief in military 
discipline, which he saw the Indians as lacking at this time. In the following weeks, 
he made very little mention of the Indian soldiers. In this period he writes mostly on 
his day-to-day activities and awaiting more news from the war.110  
 
It is not until October 30th that we see any signs of a different attitude towards 
the Indians. He wrote: ‘I nearly had a row with the RAMC major in charge, as he 
wanted to turn my Indian officers out of a first class carriage for his warrant officers. 
Typical of the attitude towards Indians’.111 This quote is the first sign that 
Grimshaw’s opinions of the Indian soldiers are multi-dimensional and, considering 
what he wrote above, beginning to change. He was willing to ‘row’ with a superior 
officer (a Major), over the treatment of Indian officers. He does not see the British 
officers as being more deserving of a first class carriage than Indian officers. This 
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being said, his comments at the beginning of combat in the 1st Ypres again reinforce 
other stereotypes discussed above. When digging trenches at night he wrote that ‘I 
knew that I could depend on the Jodhpurs for reckless bravery, I was apprehensive of 
them giving us away at such, for them, an unusual occupation of digging trenches in 
the dark’.112 This vision of ‘reckless bravery’ fits comfortably with the stereotypes 
discussed in Chapter One.  
 
 The horror of WW1 changes his writing style significantly in late November 
1914, when he describes in more detail finding the body of a soldier he knew who 
had been trampled into the mud by at least two-hundred men previously.  
  
There he was almost submerged in mud and slush… I thought of that 
youth in his home in the hills in India, probably the pride of his parents, 
and then to see him thus trampled into the mud like another piece of mud, 
of no more account than a fragment of offal… poor Ashraf Khan, an only 
son, and his mother a widow. He lived for 40 minutes.113 
 
He is using sentimental language to describe the Indians. His entries from this point 
onward are far longer than they were previously. He begins to refer to the Indian 
soldiers by name, whereas they were previously identified by rank, caste or religious 
background: ‘the subaltern sapper’ for example. He is still aware of differences 
though, which is clear in his description of the wounded: ‘Sikhs with their hair all 
down and looking more wild and weird than I have ever seen them; Pathans more 
dirty and untidy than usual’.114 As discussed above, a Sikh’s hair was a common way 
of identifying the Sikh ‘race’.115 Pathans being more dirty ‘than usual’ is another 
example of seeing specific characteristics in Indian ethnic groups. This shows that 
despite the changes in his writing, and his disillusionment with the war, Grimshaw 
still identifies with the concept of martial races.  
 
 On the day before he was injured, Grimshaw wrote this passage on WW1, 
which tells us much about the effect of his experiences on his mindset, particularly 
bearing in mind his more condescending comments above: 
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 The crashing of the enemy’s howitzer shells over the town and the 
incessant roar of battle ahead all brought the hideous reality of war home 
to me. I asked myself, is that what civilisation means? If so, what a 
mockery it all is. I looked at our men’s faces to see if I could penetrate 
their thoughts, but they wore one dead-level mask – abandoned 
indifference.116 
 
Grimshaw had not been in the trenches long, but his experiences had created 
disillusionment with WWI. He clearly has a different experience of WW1 from the 
commanding officers discussed: a far greater personal experience of combat. This 
has had a profound impact on his perceptions of the Indian soldiers. Whereas the 
British commanders would see anything less than complete honour and bravery as a 
failure, Grimshaw sees ‘abandoned indifference’ without complaint. He is also 
beginning to doubt ‘civilisation’, which could imply doubts of British and European 
superiority. In this case, the other officers attempted to help them along, no longer 
expecting enthusiasm from their charges. This suggests that Grimshaw was not alone 
in his transition towards a more sympathetic and human approach to Indian soldiers.  
 
 Grimshaw’s perceptions are far more complex than those found in the 
previous historiography. Disillusionment with WW1 has changed the language and 
perceptions of Grimshaw. We can see clearly that Grimshaw held an underlying 
belief in Empire, but it was not all he believed in. This did not cloud his perceptions 
in a way that we might have expected on the basis of previous historiography. The 
experience of trench warfare appears to have softened Grimshaw’s perceptions of the 
Indian soldiers. We should also keep his remarks in context: he was an officer in an 
army. This is a highly structured environment in which he had risen to a privileged 
rank. It would be unusual if he did not write on occasion with a superior tone. One 
would expect the same from any officer, regardless of the troops he was 
commanding. He holds a far more complex understanding of the Indian soldiers than 
the commanding officers discussed in Chapter One. His perceptions of them were far 
more sympathetic, and grew more sympathetic as the war continued and as their 
shared experiences of war united them.  
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Sam’s Soldiering By George ‘Sam’ Raschen 
 
The second primary source in this chapter is Sam’s Soldiering by George 
Raschen. Raschen fought with the Indian Army during WW1, briefly in France and 
then spending most his time in Mesopotamia.117 He started his career in India in 
1913, but left his job at the beginning of WW1 to join the Army.118 He was born in 
1889, and was thus only young when he commenced his work as an officer in the 
Indian army. His experience of India before the war was very short.119 He served as 
an ‘Emergency Commissioned Officer’ (ECO) – the name given to new officers who 
were called in to replace members of the regular officer corps, which had been 
decimated during WW1.120 His work on WW1 is part of a larger autobiography, 
Sam’s India, which was written after WWII. George’s son Daniel Raschen has edited 
the work for publishing.121 
 
The account begins with his decision to join the Indian Army. Upon his first 
meeting of the Indian soldiers he remarks that he had mistakenly expected that that 
the standards of ‘smartness’ for the Indian soldiers would be lower than that of the 
British. 122 He is referring here to the mounting of the quarter guard, so ‘smartness’ 
refers not to intelligence but to the level of discipline and order required in such a 
manoeuvre. This shows his initial expectations were very low. He is assigned to the 
21st Punjabi regiment, which he describes through the discourse of martial races. For 
example, he describes the Dogras as ‘those little quiet aristocratic chaps who gave 
such false impressions of mildness’.123 We should note that this is similar to 
Willcox’s description of the Dogras, though written in far more casual tone.124 When 
discussing all of the ‘fighting races’ of India he says that the one thing that was 
abhorred most was weakness.125 These are still his early thoughts and impressions of 
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India, but certainly he perceives the Indians in the army within the discourse of 
martial India.  
 
When in France, he discusses the position of an ECO and being asked to 
command a different group of Indian soldiers from the ones he was shipped out with. 
He states that: 
 
The trust and confidence of Indian troops stemmed from their own 
officers, built up by personal contact and mutual understandings: to 
expect them to show up as well under a newcomer, however good, was 
like expecting a good gundog to work immediately for a stranger.126 
 
This suggests that he believed the Indian soldiers depended on the trust of their 
British officers to perform in the army. We cannot be sure that he would not have 
said the same of British soldiers. However, that he says this specifically about Indian 
troops implies he believed Indian martial races were slow to adapt to change, and 
were put off by change to the extent they could not properly perform their duties. 
This shows the simplistic and racist perceptions of Raschen: he saw the Indians as 
fighting races and little more. He has high expectations of their bravery and sacrifice, 
but low expectations of everything else. His use of an animal metaphor to describe 
the Indians is particularly condescending. This perhaps shows a belief that the 
Indians were lesser forms of human life, a strong sign of British racial arrogance 
within his mindset. This can be seen when he discusses the organization in 
Mesopotamia in 1916, which he refers to as ‘chaos’. He believes the reason for this 
to be because the Indian government rather than the British government was in 
control.127  
 
Sam’s Soldiering is the work of a man who was young and enthusiastic as an 
officer. He accepts perceptions of martial races without question. He writes with a 
cheerful and jovial tone about his exploits. There are several occasions in this work 
in which his language and memory suggest these aspects of his personality. He 
details disobeying orders so as to drink with his friends.128 He discusses losing his 
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temper at a babu in charge of stores over an error, and violently attacking him.129 
Following this incident Raschen wrote that he told some of his superior officers 
‘exactly what [he] thought of their rotten show’.130 Another example of this is his 
statement regarding the difficulty of commanding Indian soldiers, discussed above. 
He shows not just his racism, but also attacks the Indian Army’s structure and policy. 
These examples show us something of Raschen’s personality, which perhaps help to 
explain his approach to the Indian soldiers. The nature of his personality, writing and 
perceptions of the Indian soldiers differ greatly from that of Grimshaw. Grimshaw 
held some similar assumptions about the Indian soldiers to Raschen, but his deeply-
felt experience of WW1 changed this. He appears to have learned from his 
experiences. Rachen has had few experiences, considering he is new to the Indian 
Army, and had only been in India since 1913. He is young, enthusiastic and brash. 
Perhaps more than any of the people in this study, he identifies with notions of 
British superiority and martial races.  
 
The Diaries and Memoirs of Albert Pike 
 
Albert Pike served in the Indian Army from 1914-1925.131 He was born in 
England in 1884, and lived in India for 10 years before joining the Indian Army at 
the beginning of the war. The notes used in this study are based on diary entries 
made at the time, which were written in Urdu, French and English, though the copies 
used here were typed in English in the 1950s and 1960s. He spent time in the 
Western Front, including the battle of the Somme, and then was moved to the Middle 
East where he fought in Palestine. The diaries and notes in this collection are 
relatively brief, but provide some insight into Pike’s opinions.  
 
We can learn something from the fact that sections of his memoirs were 
written in Urdu. He was clearly interested enough in Indian culture, not just to learn a 
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language, but also to use it ahead of English. There is further evidence to support 
this. For example, he describes a train ride with eighteen Indian officers, all of whom 
spoke Urdu: 
 
We made Urdu the common language and I answered dozens of 
questions about London and what to do and not to do! … On the train 
journey there were misgivings about the food at lunch, to some beef was 
tabu, to others pork an abomination, some complete vegetarians and so 
on.132  
 
Pike again shows he was willing to talk primarily in Urdu. He also requested 
appropriate food for his officers. He was aware of differences in diet and was willing 
to accommodate these by ordering baskets of fruit, which shocked the French 
waiter.133 
 
The tone of the work is interesting as well. He describes making weekend 
hunting plans with his Indian officers. He refers to Indian officers frequently by 
name. He describes in some detail a bet with ‘X’ over hunting: ‘Discussing our week 
end plans with Jemadar Dost Mahomed I remarked that we would have to find a few 
score brace of really slow moving birds if we were ever to sting X for the port’.134 
Spending his leisure time with Indian officers certainly signals his friendship with 
them. He does not appear to discriminate in any way, except possibly when he uses 
terms common in the Indian Army, such referring to Indian officers by their race, 
‘senior Rajput officer’, for example.135 This does not seem to be because of his 
personality or beliefs, but because of the environment he lived in. His description of 
his companions’ reactions to this hunting trip gives a useful example: ‘The Rajput 
officers accepted the “kill” with pleasant anticipation of roasted pork and savoury 
curries, to the Moslems it was of course the final work in uncleanliness, such is the 
difference in religious teachings’.136 His friendship with the Indian soldiers is a key 
aspect of his memory of the Indian Army. He wrote: 
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 They were good days, we had plenty of congenial work, all the rough 
shooting anyone could desire, and that splendid camaraderie which no 
future generation of ours will ever know; the joys of West and East 
meeting in the friendly respect and mutual good fellowship of the old 
Indian Army days.137 
 
Pike writes of both groups more as an independent observer than many others in this 
study. His descriptive language is never condescending and rarely relies on terms 
associated with martial races. He does not discuss honour or specific racial 
characteristics. Rather, he appears as more a detached observer, an individual curious 
about other cultures.  
 
There are clearly many differences in the five accounts discussed here. How 
then, can we explain the differences in accounts between the commanding officers 
and the officers of lower-ranks? Part of the difference lies simply in the military 
hierarchy: junior officers fought with the Indians, commanding officers did not. 
Their leadership positions in the military hierarchy also help to explain why they saw 
the Indians in such broad stereotypes.138 However, the reasons are more complex 
than this. Consider, for example, the two sources that identify least with British racial 
stereotypes: Pike and Grimshaw. These sources have much to set them apart from the 
others used in these two chapters: they are the only ones not written for a mass 
audience and they had the closest combat relationships with the Indian soldiers.139 
This suggests that the experience of combat, particularly on the Western Front, 
changed the perceptions of soldiers who fought with the Indian Army. Also, these 
were the two sources that were written for personal reasons. It is reasonable to infer, 
then, that they are the more reliable sources. Certainly, these are the most intimate 
and personal account of the war discussed.  
 
As for WW1 as a transforming event, only Grimshaw’s diary shows strong 
signs of changes in his opinion and language. This is partly because it is the only 
source produced that was not influenced by memory. He doubted the abilities and the 
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minds of the Indians in his regiment to begin with, but by the end he had softened 
significantly. His language changed and his perceptions altered. These changes were 
not widespread across all sources, but that there is some evidence to suggest that the 
perceptions of the British officers were not set in stone.  
 
What then, can we say of the arguments of previous scholars? Were the 
British officers ‘unashamedly racist’ as Greenhut argued?140 This argument is not 
entirely inaccurate but it is simplistic, and provides little more than a starting point 
for a study. In these sources, we see varying degrees of racism and different types of 
racism. Pike is the clearest exception, as he interacted with the Indian soldiers on a 
more social level and did not doubt their ability. Pike mentions cultural differences 
between religious groups and ethnic groups, but does not see specific racial qualities 
in the way others do. Grimshaw’s perceptions changed over the period, but he still 
saw elements of racial characteristics.141 While this stayed the same, his conception 
of the Indian soldier’s role in the Indian Army changed. He was uncomplaining 
about not seeing a ‘dead-level mask’ in the Indian soldiers. Pike and Grimshaw also 
have different perceptions of the Indians’ role in the army, compared to the others in 
this study. This is in stark contrast to Willcox’s belief that all the British officers 
would agree with him that the Indian officers should not hold high positions in the 
army.142  
Conceptions of bravery tend to be quite common amongst all sources. 
Grimshaw does mention that he ‘knew [he] could depend on the Jodhpurs for 
reckless bravery.’143 Alexander, as discussed in Chapter One, had very clear 
perceptions of what Indian bravery was, and when someone fell outside this 
conception, it was a man he referred to as ‘white’.144 However, in Pike’s memoirs, 
there is nothing to suggest that he felt the Indian’s conception of bravery was 
irrational or ‘reckless’. In this case, the fact that he wrote nothing of it would suggest 
that he did not find it to be important. Still, there appears to be a broad common 
conception that the Indians were brave but reckless. However, this belief was not as 
firmly held as previous scholars have suggested.  
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  The culture of imperialism in the Indian Army was strong, but not 
overwhelming. The institutionalised racism of the Indian Army was difficult for 
British officers to escape. Grimshaw’s language was still wrapped up in the discourse 
of the British Empire and superiority, but his comments towards the end of his diary 
on showed that disillusionment with the war had changed his perceptions. This 
suggests that while racism was widespread, it was not nearly as strong among British 
junior officers in WW1 as it was with the commanders. War experience, rank and 
individual personality were all determining factors in how British officers perceived 
the Indian soldiers during WW1. These are factors which have until now been 
largely ignored.  
 
To see belief in the Empire tested by WW1 gives a new perspective to the 
debates on Indianization and British perceptions of Raj, Empire and the Indians. My 
analysis suggests that the martial races discourse was present even in very 
sympathetic sources, like Pike and Grimshaw. This suggests that a belief in racial 
theories was common. Colonial ethnographers and the British Raj constructed 
‘martial races’, but junior officers used its discourse as well as high-ranking officers. 
This supports Barua’s argument on Indianization that martial races were genuinely 
believed in by the broader British Empire. He does not ‘flaunt’ his pro-British ‘bias’, 
but shows empathy for the British individuals, which other studies fail to do.145 This 
also supports Greenhut’s conclusion that racism was very widespread, but my 
analysis shows that there are serious flaws in this approach. The subtleties, changes 
and differences in the accounts discussed in this chapter are lost when writing on 
race relations in the Indian Army from a high command perspective. This is the 
difference between the basis of British civilian and military policy towards India and 
the individual perceptions of those who fought along side the actual Indian soldiers. 
The two affect each other, but are far from inseparable, as the use of different sources 
has shown. Racism is just one aspect of this relationship. The brutality of the combat 
does appear to have changed the perceptions of some of the officer corps. Exactly 
how common the attitudes of Grimshaw and Pike were at the time is difficult to tell. 
They may be isolated examples or they may be relatively common. While it is the 
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case that the institutions of the Indian Army were inherently racist and that racial 
attitudes were prevalent, WW1 experiences changed the perceptions of at least some 
of the people involved. Clearly some in the Indian army held genuine interests in 
Indian culture, while others’ opinions were softened by the experience of combat. 
This point becomes even clearer when we consider the unchanging opinions of the 
commanding officers, who did not experience the war in the same way. There is a 
clear correlation between war experience, disillusionment and a softening of belief in 
British racial attitudes. Previous historiography has ignored this. My analysis 
suggests that WWI combat had a very strong effect on pre-1914 ideas. With the 
soldiers who fought beside the Indians on the Western Front, the belief in Empire 
and martial races is far less explicit. This is strong example of Metcalf’s concept of 
‘difference’ being broken down, with far less explicit focus on what divided the 
British and the Indians.  
 
While the commanders were insulated from the changing effect of combat in 
WWI, the junior officers were not. The experience of war in the trenches forced upon 
their consciousness the essential unity of human beings. It has been pointed out in 
some of the previous historiography of WWI that the trench experience could break 
down class barriers.146 Though historians are divided on the extent to which this is 
true, this study confirms that direct and shared experience of the horrors of the war 
can break down barriers of race constructed by the ideology of Empire. The maturity 
and experience with Indian culture also seems to have effected the change. Grimshaw 
and Pike had long experience in India, and developed more nuanced perceptions than 
the inexperienced Raschen. The difference between Grimshaw and Pike and the 
commanders, who also had experience of India, is direct combat experience in WWI. 
 
 The experience of WWI, through close proximity to the ‘other’, both 
emotional and physical and the universal human emotions, such as the fear of death, 
broke down the barriers of race. Faced with what truly unifies us as human beings, the 
artificial differences constructed by ideologies of Empire and race crumbled. 
Experience of this kind can challenge pre-conceptions about other people. This 
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explains the difference between the responses of the British commanders and the 
British junior officers. Different roles led to different experiences during the war. So 
we might expect to see a similar result when we turn to the experiences of the Indian 
soldiers.  
Chapter Three: Indian Soldiers  
  
How did combat affect the ideals of the Indians? This chapter will deal with 
the ways in which Indian soldiers on the Western Front perceived the Empire, and the 
strength of their identification with its values. There are very few published primary 
sources by Indian soldiers in WWI. As a result, this chapter will focus on letters 
written by Indian soldiers. This means that there is less scope for detailed discussion 
of the perceptions of individuals, but broader trends can be established. I will focus on 
how the Indians saw their own role in the Indian Army; the extent to which they 
identified with izzat and Imperial loyalty and how these perceptions were affected by 
the experience of WWI. These letters focus on the Western Front, where the Indian 
infantry served from 1914-1915, while the cavalry remained until 1918.  
 
The effect that WWI had on the Indian soldier’s beliefs has not yet been 
studied, though exhaustive studies have been conducted of the British soldiers.147 The 
traditional approach has been to focus on disillusionment arguing that soldiers’ 1914 
ideals, patriotism and enthusiasm for war were quickly washed away.148 Much focus 
was initially placed on war poets, who portrayed much disillusionment with the 
war.149 This approach has been criticised by ‘revisionist’ historians, who have argued 
that ideals were not as completely washed away. Hynes has argued that popular 
perceptions of the war in British culture are far too simplistic, and is very critical of 
the focus on war poets.150 Sheffield wrote that morale was generally high, defended 
British high commands tactics and argued that the war has been forgotten as the 
success it was.151 Many scholars also fall in between the two extreme approaches.152 
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Eksteins argues that while there was a lot of disillusionment, the soldiers were nearly 
always loyal.153 Wilson surveys different sources, such as war poems and Fredrick 
Manning’s Her Privates We to find many different views.154 Manning’s work finds 
the duality of WWI: focusing on both the horror and violence and a lust for 
revenge.155  
 
Within this vast historiography, there are very few studies of Indian soldiers. 
David Omissi has edited a collection of over 600 letters by Indian soldiers, with very 
limited editorial notes, provides most the primary source material in this chapter.156 
He has also written a brief article on the cross-cultural relations within the Empire, 
discussing Indian soldiers’ impressions of England and France during WWI.157 
Ellinwood has produced a large descriptive work on the diary of Amar Singh, a 
Rajput officer in the Indian Army between 1905-1921. Ellinwood shows how Singh 
straddled both worlds, positioned as he was between the Indian rankers and the 
British. He identified very strongly with the British officers, and, as an aristocrat, did 
not appear to think highly of many Indian soldiers.158 This is an interesting approach, 
but Singh was far from representative of the Indian Army as a whole. Roy’s 
discussion of recruitment to the Indian Army reveals that some were motivated by 
izzat, or perceived martial heritage and others were motivated by financial rewards.159 
This suggests that izzat and Empire did not motivate all Indian soldiers to begin with, 
but by financial factors. The British directed loyalty towards the King-Emperor, 
which was accepted differently by individual soldiers.160 This discussion will look at 
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how they reacted to WWI, and what affect it had on their loyalty, izzat, and their 
relationship with the British Empire. VanKoski has produced a brief study of letters 
by Indian soldiers on the Western Front, which will also be used in this chapter. She 
argues that Indian soldiers were motivated by love of God, Government, King, and 
Empire. They were also influenced by the desire to win honour for family, caste, 
regiment and the army.161 An Indian officer writes to another Indian officer:  
 
Remember that the work you do now will gain for you a good name or a 
bad name which will last you the rest of your life … You must always 
bear in mind your own honour and the honour of your family. There is 
nothing else in life better than honour.162 
 
Another wrote on the behaviour of the 15th Lancers, who ‘mutinied’ in Mesopotamia, 
as they did not wish to fight fellow Muslims: 
 
When I read about the behaviour of the regiment, I was overwhelmed 
with grief … this is the time to show loyalty and give help to the 
Government and not to be false to one’s salt. It was to work for 
government and not for disobedience that they girded their loins and left 
their nearest and dearest … I feel sure that you will remember your 
hereditary services and show yourself worthy of your family tradition.163 
 
These letters show both the loyalty to the British government and a strong belief in 
honour. They show the nature of izzat: a pride in having done what was needed, that 
reflects on one’s self, and one’s family, for all the past, present and future. It can also 
be tied to the government and any identity that a soldier has. The mention of 
government shows that the author viewed the British Raj as a natural and accepted part 
of India. They connect the Raj to their own family life through honour and duty. This 
is a major part of VanKoski’s argument on the motivations of the Indian soldiers: that 
the British were able to tie the regimental esprit de corps to the values of the Punjab 
peasantry.164 ‘Hereditary service’ implies that they believe their role in the Indian 
Army is part of a family connection with the British Empire. The findings of 
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VanKoski are useful, but also have limitations. She fails to discuss lack of motivation. 
Asking the question ‘what motivated Indian soldiers to fight?’ as VanKoski did, will 
find that they fought for Empire, honour and duty. But this question assumes that all 
Indians were motivated to fight. We cannot tell the depth and breadth of Indian 
motivation, or if there were changes throughout WWI. We have seen that British 
officers and commanders differed greatly in their views, largely because of different 
experiences of WWI. We might expect that Indian soldiers would differ in their views 
in similar ways for similar reasons. How, then, did the Indian identification with the 
concepts of izzat, martial races and Imperial ideology change when faced with combat 
on the Western Front?  
 
The sources used to discuss these issues will be taken from Omissi’s 
collection of letters, Indian Voices of the Great War. These letters are organised 
chronologically and selected to be representative of the surviving material. There are 
only very limited editorial notes in this collection.  Omissi notes three exceptions to 
this: where there are many letters expressing the similar sentiments, only a few are 
included and the common thread is flagged; he has included several letters of 
particular human or historical interest or of striking beauty; and the focus is on 
combat experience, rather than rear-echelon activities.165 This does not present a 
problem for this study, though it is important to realise that these letters were selected 
with the aim of being representative. We must simply trust the editor when his notes 
identify a common theme in the letters. I will focus my discussion on letters from 
1915 and 1916, as this is when the Indian Army had its largest numbers on the 
Western Front.166  
 
It should be noted that these letters have been censored but, as Omissi argues, 
this limitation should not be overstated.167 Most officers were too busy to censor 
letters in any great detail. Letters were rarely withheld and were rarely edited.168 The 
letters in this collection themselves show how much passed through censorship. 
Furthermore, the aim of censorship was not so much to prevent the Indian soldiers 
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from communicating, but to gather information on morale and to ensure sensitive 
tactical information did not get out.169 The thought that a letter is being read and 
censored may have had a larger effect on what was written, rather than the censorship 
itself.170 
 
Omissi has described in some detail the motivational problems that faced the 
Indian Army during WWI.171 At the beginning of the campaign, many soldiers 
became disillusioned and depressed. Omissi argues that this was because they were 
far from home in a brutal modern war that appeared to have no end in sight. Many 
soldiers were depressed when they were injured and were particularly disillusioned by 
having to return to the trenches once they had recovered.172 Problems with morale 
following heavy losses were notably greater with Indian units than with the British.173  
 
Despite morale problems, many soldiers wrote often about their desire to do 
their duty to the British government. They express this in terms of izzat. There are 
many examples of this in Omissi’s collection. Some soldiers directly identify with 
notions of honour. One wrote that: ‘To die in the battlefield is glory. For a thousand 
years one’s name will be remembered … it is our destiny to conquer’.174 To 
understand izzat we must examine the religious beliefs of the soldiers.175 That a belief 
in an afterlife made it easier for soldiers to continue fighting is a common theme in 
these letters. One soldier makes a direct connection between honour, death and 
religion, by writing: ‘God is all powerful. He alone can protect one from death. The 
atheist never achieves izzat, and his mind is always unsettled. He never has any 
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consolation’.176 Many soldiers saw death on the battlefield as a way of guaranteeing 
entry into heaven, rather than continuing the cycle of birth and rebirth on earth.177 
This might have made the experience of WWI easier to handle, if death is not final in 
the minds of the combatants.  
 
When looking at the letters of Indian soldiers, it is easy to find very conflicting 
opinions of the war. Two Sikhs, for example, who seemingly had much in common, 
held very different perspectives. Both were from the Amritsar district. Both were 
wounded, and taken to hospital in England and they wrote within a week of each 
other. The first was suffering from pneumonia and wrote that the government was 
looking after him well, and that: ‘it is our first duty to show our loyal gratitude to 
Government’.178 The second was hit on his trigger finger, and was about to have it 
amputated. This letter speaks nothing of duty to the government. Rather, he wrote 
that: ‘the battle is beginning and men are dying like maggots. No one can count them 
– not in thousands but in hundreds and thousands of thousands. No one can count 
them.’179 He also wrote that as his finger was being amputated, he hoped to be sent 
home. These two men reacted to their experience of war in very different ways. It is 
possible that the second man had injured himself intentionally to escape combat, 
given his mindset and his injury.180 Here we have one man, who having seen combat, 
still wished to do his duty to the government, and another who wished to be sent 
home, and may have even injured himself to ensure his safety. This suggests that the 
experience of combat was far more varied than VanKoski’s article supposes.  
 
Some soldiers, defying censorship, tell their friends and relatives not to sign 
up. An Indian officer, a Havildar, was a part of the censorship mechanism. His letter 
to a friend in the Punjab is a very telling one: 
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If you have any relatives, my advice is don’t let them enlist. It is 
unnecessary to write any more. I write so much to you as I am Pay 
Havildar and read the letters to the double company commander. 
Otherwise there is a strict order against writing on this subject.181 
 
This letter implies that the Indian officer upon whom the censorship relied was 
willing to send his own letter through as he was in a unique position to get around the 
censorship. This is unusual, as it is an Indian officer subverting the censorship, but the 
sentiment is quite common. Others sent coded messages, aware that censorship was in 
place, to their family urging them not to enlist. One man wrote to his brother: ‘Think 
over what I say and you will understand what I mean when I say “stay in the 
village”’.182 Upon a friend from his unit being injured, a Pathan wrote to him: 
‘wherever you go, do not straighten your back. Then, please God, something good 
will come of it … I wish to impress this upon you as strongly as I can … do not 
straighten your back. Your position is a very good one’.183 He implored the injured 
man to exaggerate the extent of his back injury so that he would be sent home. These 
types of actions were clearly not just isolated examples. They show that izzat was not 
the main goal for all the Indian soldiers. Either their loyalties were not strong to begin 
with, or they had been completely changed by disillusionment with WWI.  
 
One man was clearly angry about his situation, but directed his anger not at 
the Germans or the British, but rather at his wife. He wrote to her: ‘We perish in the 
desert: you wash yourself and lie in bed. We are trapped in a net of woe, while you go 
free. Our life is a living death. For what great sin are we being punished?’184 Two 
letters written in January and February 1915 portray another reaction to the combat. 
When reading these letters, one would not know for certain which side the Indians 
were on since they show no malice towards the Germans, and give little praise to the 
British. The scale and kind of the combat appear to have fostered this belief. One 
wounded soldier wrote: ‘here the state of things is such that all the world over there 
will be two women for each man. This you must think over till you understand it. All 
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the kings have been ruined.’185 This is a long letter, which talks of both the English 
and the British, without any emotive language, either positive or negative. Another 
wrote that he was ‘greatly distressed in mind’ because of the war.186 He was shocked 
that the British would send men back to the front after they had been wounded and 
concerned the war would go on for many years.187. There is no enthusiasm in this 
writing; they have a completely different tone to those that discuss izzat directly. They 
may not have lost their attachment to the empire, it is quite possible they lacked 
enthusiasm to begin with.  
 
However, others are quite enthusiastic. One soldier in France urges another 
soldier in the Punjab to get more recruits: ‘this is not time for slackness. Consider the 
way in which the whole country is exerting itself and doing its duty.’188 Another was 
enthusiastic about France and England, particularly about the possibility of travel:  
 
‘What am I to say to you about England? May God grant victories to our 
King. If I were to set about writing down the praises of Marseilles, my 
hand would be wearied with writing. Further, I went to Paris for seven 
days. What is Paris? It is heaven!’189  
 
Even the death of friend did not always shake the opinions of soldiers who strongly 
believed in izzat and the British cause. One wrote of such an event: 
 
‘He was buried in a Muslim cemetery near London with great honour and 
dignity. The exalted Government has showered every blessing on us 
here, which I shall remember all my life, and which will bind me in 
complete loyalty.’190 
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This letter shows a very strong belief in honour, tied to the British Empire. it is 
important to note that both letters above were written in 1916, after spending 
considerable time in the war. 
 
 One solider commented on his joy in another Garhwali wining the Victoria 
Cross: ‘the fame of the Garhwalis is now higher than the skies. On the Garhwalis … 
has won the honour of the Victoria Cross and, having made the reputation of his 
family for three generations, has arrived in Lansdowne.’191 This shows that the 
honour of one man was extended to his family and his ethnicity. This is a conception 
of izzat that the British wished to inspire and one similar to that of General 
Willcox.192   
The conditions of the war were also met with very contrasting opinions. One 
soldier wrote: ‘I swear by God that, since your letter came, I have eaten and drunk but 
little and have had no sleep.’193 Only two weeks later, another soldier wrote: ‘The 
arrangements of our benign government are deserving of all praise. We receive 
everything in plenty – clothes and food, and all things that are necessary. We want for 
nothing – do not be anxious.’ 194 In the former letter, there is a sense of the soldier 
trying to reassure his audience. He may be putting a brave face on, so as not to worry 
them. Despite this, he refers to the government as ‘benign’, presenting a very positive 
vision of British Government of India. Clearly the first author was not concerned with 
this, which shows his fragile state of mind at the time. These are further examples of 
very different reactions to WWI. 
 
 Following the departure of the infantry in early 1916, only the Indian cavalry 
remained on the Western Front. From this point onwards, the letters more frequently 
speak favourably of izzat, Empire and loyalty, rather than ambivalence or 
depression.195 This is because the cavalry had seen very little action leading up to 
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the fighting.196 The cavalrymen appear to have accepted the difficulties of combat, but 
are still determined to do their job. A good example is a cavalryman warning a friend 
of the dangers of enlisting: ‘do not say after two or three months that you are unable 
to serve or unable to ride … unless one’s heart is in one’s work one cannot perform it 
properly’.197 There are still concerns about pay and conditions. One soldier’s wife 
wrote to him: ‘Now I have had to pawn my jewellery to keep myself alive. The order 
has now been issued that we are to get only half the usual allowance. How am I to live 
on Rs.2.8 a month?’198 The censor noted at this time that this was a very common 
concern.199 
 
It is impossible to show that an individual did not have a belief in the British 
Empire by the lack of enthusiasm in one letter. A letter is but a snapshot of a person’s 
mentality in one moment in time. Yet, these letters are all the evidence that we have. 
If disillusionment, ambivalence or anger comes through in a letter rather than a 
concern for honour or duty, we must accept this as being more powerful in the 
individual’s mind at the time of writing. As these themes come through frequently, we 
cannot make the argument that the Indian soldiers were motivated by honour and 
duty, because clearly many of them no longer believed in these. We should bear in 
mind what has been discussed in the first two chapters of this study. Some of the 
British officers, such as Willcox and Alexander, believed the role of the Indian 
soldiers was to be completely loyal. Some of the Indians saw this as their role too, as 
we have already seen from a number of examples. The British would often regard the 
Indians as undifferentiated and unified groups with specific characteristics. This is 
only evidence of British perceptions, rather than an accurate description of Indian 
ethnic groups. One lesson from the deeply contrasting viewpoints of the Indian 
soldiers is to show the simplicity of British perceptions could be. 
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Clearly, from these letters we can see that the concept of izzat was not so all 
encompassing for the Indian Soldiers as VanKoski’s article argued. Izzat was 
something to live up to, but in many cases, these letters suggest that it was far from 
universal, its breadth and depth is questionable. Often, when writing to family 
members, soldiers would write on how appalling the war was and make no mention of 
having to do their duty of honour. Instead, they were weary soldiers who felt that they 
had to continue doing what they were doing, as they had no other option. 
 
Letters rarely mention Indian Army structures or perceptions of British 
officers. This is partly due to self-censorship and the fact that they are more 
concerned with day-to-day issues, such as survival.200 This is may be partly because 
the editor of the collection was focused on the war experience.201 Lack of comment on 
individual officers may suggest that the Indians saw the British as a broad and unified 
group, as many of the British saw the Indians. This is speculative to some extent, as 
the sources lack specifics, but it appears reasonable. Disrespect for army rules, such 
as attempting self-injury or encouraging family members or friends not to sign up, 
shows that many soldiers did not identify strongly with Indian Army discipline or 
izzat. Those who were undisciplined do not appear to have done so for any reason 
other than disillusionment with WWI. The soldiers who happily accepted discipline 
and izzat clearly were not bothered by their position.202 This acceptance of racial 
attitudes was not changed by disillusionment with WWI. This is not surprising, as 
they were recruited from backward areas, many were poorly educated and illiterate, 
and had no links with the nationalist movement.203 
 
What we see are different levels of attachment to the Empire; some seem to 
believe in izzat, others do not. Some of those who did not believe in it may never 
have, others may have lost it as a consequence of the war experience. Some soldiers 
showed remarkable persistence in holding strong belief in notions of duty and honour. 
There are many examples of the extreme reactions to WWI: those who tried to injure 
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themselves to escape, or urged others not to sign up, and those who felt strong 
connections to the Empire and the British cause. Again, this is partly because this 
study is based on an edited collection, which, while broadly representative, picks out 
the most interesting responses to the war. Many letters in this collection do not 
express a strong belief either way; they are concerned largely with day-to-day issues, 
such as survival, living conditions and the financial situation of their family. 
 
As was seen in the Chapters One and Two, there were different responses to 
WWI. There are different levels of attachment to the British Empire and the British 
cause in WWI. It would be impossible from this collection of letters to frame a 
‘traditional’ argument about the response of soldiers to WWI. The pre-1914 ideals of 
Indian soldiers were clearly not washed away entirely. Concepts of izzat and Empire 
still resonated strongly in some sources, even among some letters from some letters 
late in the Indian campaign on the Western Front in 1916.204 In the sources that 
identify strongly with izzat there appears to be a felt personal connection to the 
Empire and the British cause. These soldiers tie the ideals of izzat to those of British 
Empire. The strength of these ideals can also be explained through some soldiers’ 
religious beliefs, such as reincarnation or an afterlife. This helped to remove or lessen 
the fear of death, which was identified among British officers in Chapter Two as 
being a key factor in changing previously held ideals of Empire.  
 
When belief in religion, izzat and the British Empire were in alignment, the 
soldiers’ ideals withstood the test of combat. We should bear in mind that the Indian 
Army did not fight at the Somme, with the exception of some cavalry units. Had the 
army stayed on longer, there may have been more widespread disillusionment among 
both the British officers and Indian soldiers, as has been identified in studies of 
British soldiers.205 While some Indian soldiers felt their belief in the British 
government, Empire and izzat were strong during combat, others were battle-weary, 
depressed and sought a way out. Those who remained loyal, as with the experience of 
the commanders, experienced combat in a different way, with less fear for their own 
lives. They would not have seen any strong reason to change their ideals. We can 
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conclude from these sources that the pre-1914 ideals of the Indian soldiers were 
severely tested by WWI, but that there was no common experience of disillusionment.  
 
Conclusion: The Test of the First World War 
 
This thesis has examined the affect of WWI on the pre-1914 ideals of the 
Indian Army. The comparisons of the three groups discussed; commanders, junior 
officers and Indian soldiers, show much about how different beliefs were influenced 
by war experiences.  
 
The commanding officers belief in the Empire and their conservative views on 
structure of the Indian Army were maintained throughout the war. Their pre-war 
conceptions of Empire and the Indian soldiers do not appear to have changed much 
from their experience of WWI. The junior officers opinions changed, though not 
present in all sources, towards a more sympathetic view of the Indian soldier, out of 
step with the imperial ideology of their commanders. The Indian soldier’s perceptions 
of the Empire were tested by WWI, but did not change evenly, partly due to the 
strength of some soldiers religious and cultural beliefs.  
 
This tells us that the strength of an individual’s pre-war conceptions, their 
position in the army and their experience of WWI were the key factors in shaping 
their perceptions of the Empire. The experience of commanders, for example, was 
shaped by their high position. They had to remain detached from their men, whose 
lives their strategy endangered. Their preconceptions of the men as members of a 
fierce fighting race made this detachment easier. They had little direct contact with 
the Indian soldiers, a role left to the British junior officers.206 They also did not spend 
time in the trenches with the Indians soldiers. This removed them from the dangerous 
environment. However, the British junior officers and the Indian soldiers fought 
together in the trenches, and this appears to have changed their perceptions quite 
frequently. The British junior officers that had their perceptions of the Indians change, 
Grimshaw and Pike, both spent a great amount of time on the Western Front, and 
write of direct contact with the Indians.  
 
The Indian soldiers had different reactions to the war. those whose personal 
cultural and religious ideologies were in alignment with the ideologies of Empire and 
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martial races: and those whose personal belief systems did not reinforce the ideology 
of Empire. This group’s experience was similar to the experience of the junior 
officers, in that the death and disillusionment overcame any strong sense of 
connection to Empire. Many Indian soldiers wrote of their desire to die in combat, as 
it would lead to heaven or that they felt compelled to fight so as to fulfil their family 
legacy, or for their family’s izzat. This shows us that experience can challenge 
ideology, but if an individual’s personal beliefs are aligned with the prevailing 
ideology those preconceptions may remain intact – even in the face of the often-
overwhelming horror of war.  
 
A study of these issues has not previously been completed about the Indian 
Army. The results support the ‘revisionist’ perspective on the trench experience, by 
showing that many soldiers, in this case particularly Indians soldiers, were able to 
maintain their pre-1914 ideals. This being said, there was also much disillusionment 
with both the war and the ideals of Empire and izzat, suggesting that there was no 
universal experience of war for the Indian soldiers. These findings also show the 
previous historiography on the race relations within the Indian Army are too 
simplistic. This is the first study to look at these issues from the perspective of the 
British junior officers in WWI. This has revealed that the junior officers opinions, 
largely as a result of WWI combat with the Indian soldiers had become more 
complicated and sympathetic than those of their more detached commanders.   
 
Further study of this subject could focus on further primary source material, 
particularly from the British junior officers and the Indian soldiers. A broader study of 
Indian soldiers in WWI, using letters and other primary sources could better 
distinguish what the most common response to WWI. Likewise, there are more 
primary sources from British officers in the Indian Army in WWI, on the Western 
Front and in the Middle East, held in the Liddle collection of Leeds University.207 
These could be used to examine in greater detail how the British officers perceived 
the Indian soldiers, and how these perceptions were changed by combat experience in 
WWI. This thesis has  
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